





Department of Economics 
Working Paper No. 0305 
http://nt2.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/pub/wp/wp0305.pdf 
 
Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and 
 the Decision to Hospitalize 
 
Åke Blomqvist 
National University of Singapore 
Pierre Thomas Léger 
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Much of thehealth economicsliteraturehas focussed on thee¤ects ofdi¤erent payment mechanisms
and insuranceschemes on theutilization ofmedical services. In thepresence ofconventional service
bene…t insurance, individuals will want to use medical care beyond e¢cient levels (the traditional
moral hazard problem). Furthermore, physicians that are paid for each service they provide (in a
fee-for-servicesystem) may not only bewilling to supply ine¢ciently large volumesofcare, but may
also have incentives to encourage utilization (the problem of supplier-induced demand). In order
to reduce the problems associated with moral hazard and supplier-induced demand, insurers have
used demand-side incentives (such as patient cost-sharing through co-insurance and deductibles),
as well as supply-side incentives aimed at providers (such as paying physicians through salary or
capitation, or hospitals through episode-based prospective reimbursement).
Formal models dealing with these issues have generally been speci…ed so as to involve only one
type of medical care. That is, they have abstracted from the fact that the health services sector
produces many types of care, using a variety of di¤erent kinds of inputs. For example, certain
kinds of disease may be treated through a combination of physician services and pharmaceuticals.
In other cases, there may be substitutability between outpatient services provided by primary-
care physicians and services provided by hospital-based specialists. Although the latter may be
necessary for individuals that su¤er from particularly complex and severe forms ofillness, excessive
use of specialist and hospital care may be ine¢cient and inappropriate. First, for certain kinds
of illness, primary-care physicians may be able to provide treatment at lower cost. Furthermore,
specialist in-hospital careis morelikely to be invasiveand risky, and thus should only beused when
’medically warranted’ (Frank and Clancy, 1997). Providing incentives to ensure that patients use
the appropriate type of care is thus important both from a health perspective, and for economic
reasons. In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects ofvariouskinds ofdemand- and supply-sideincentives
in the context of a model in which patients and doctors must consider not only the aggregate
2quantity ofhealth services to usein treating various kinds of illness, but also have a choice between
di¤erent kinds of providers, in particular, outpatient services rendered by primary-care physicians
or inpatient services provided by hospital-based specialists.
Althoughtheoretical work on theeconomicsofreferralstohospitals andspecialists islimited and
quite recent, there is a growing empirical literature that has examined physician referral patterns.1
Overall, 4.5 per cent of visits to primary care physicians in the US result in a referral (Frank and
Clancy, 1997).2 Furthermore, although hospital admissionsarerelatively rare(approximately 10per
cent ofindividualsin theRand Study experienced oneormoreadmissionsin a year), hospitalization
episodes are very costly so that the cost of hospital care accounts for a large portion of health care
costs.3 Onaverage, each referral resultsin US$3,000 inhospital chargesand professional fees(Glenn
et al., 1987).
Potentially important factors that may in‡uence the use of specialist and hospital care include
whether or not patients are allowed to seek such care on their own (that is, without a referral from
a primary-care provider). Although many health-care systems and managed-care plans prohibit
patient self-referrals to specialty care and in-hospital care, others do not, and it has been estimated
that in the US, 30 to 50 per cent ofall specialist consultations take placeas a result of self-referrals
(Forest and Reid, 1997). In American managed care plans, a common device for a¤ecting the use
of hospital services isto require a ’second opinion’ beforeapproval is given forhospitalization. This
may beonereason that HMOpatientsare less likely to behospitalizedcompared to theirnon-HMO
counterparts (Newhouse et al., 1993).
Empirical work providessomeevidencethat therateofhospitalizationisin‡uencedby incentives
both on the supply side and on the demand side. With respect to supply-side factors, there is
1Theoretical work on referrals include Shortell (1972), Bradford and Martin (1960), Glazer and McGuire (1992)
as well as related work by Pauly (1979) and Wolinsky (1993).
2Based on American survey data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) for the years
1985 to 1992.
3For example, in the Rand ’Free Plan’ (no co-payments or deductibles), the likelihood of any use of medical care
was 86.8 per cent, while the likelihood of one or more hospital admissions was 10.3 per cent. Furthemore, the average
total expenditure (per person per year) was $982 (1991 dollars) with $536 dollars of that in in-patient expenditures
(Table 3.2, page 40, Newhouse et al., 1993).
3evidence to suggest that primary-care physicians who are paid on the basis of fee for service are
less likely to refer patients than are physicians paid through capitation (Grembowski et al., 1998).
Furthermore, in cases where primary-care physicians have a role as gatekeepers (that is, a referral
from a primary-care doctor is required for a patient to receive treatment by a specialist or in
hospital), it has been found that gatekeepers who face …nancial risks when they refer (that is, who
have to pay some of the cost of specialist and hospital care used by their patients) are less likely
to refer to specialists (Martin et al., 1989; Hurley et al, 1991). Patients also appear to respond
to demand-side incentives when making decisions with respect to specialist care. Shortell and
Vahovich (1975) …nd that patients with higher third-party coverageare morelikely to usespecialist
care. Furthermore, among persons that belong to a government plan, thosewho havesupplemental
insurance aremore likely to usespecialist care than thosewho do not (Shea et al., 1999). The Rand
data also suggest, although weakly, that patient cost-sharing reduces total hospital expenditures
(Newhouse et al., 1993).
In this paper, we extend the study of demand- and supply-side incentives to a model in which
we explicitly consider the interaction between insurance and the choice between primary care and
in-hospital care. We …nd that such a model yields certain new insights for both types of incentives.
With respect to conventional insurance plans in which utilization is in‡uenced by demand-side
incentives(patient cost-sharing), we…nd that themoral-hazardproblem associatedwithoverutiliza-
tion of services from a given provider may be signi…cantly exacerbated because patient cost-sharing
will also in‡uence the patient’s choice of provider (i.e., their decision to be hospitalized). This
e¤ect may be an important one in searching for the optimum degree of patient cost-sharing, and is
likely to be particularly signi…cant in assessing the e¤ect of plans in which there is a lower degree
of cost-sharing for hospital care because it tends to be used in cases of serious illness. An interest-
ing …nding is that managed-care plans that use patient cost-sharing as the principal cost control
mechanism, but control hospital utilization through a second-opinion requirement, may yield a
substantially more e¢cient pattern of care than plans that rely on patient cost sharing alone.
4In somemodels that explorethee¤ects ofdi¤erent insurancearrangements in an environment of
informationasymmetry betweenprovidersand patients, it hasbeenshown that paying primary-care
physicians through capitation may be e¢cient in the sense that it reduces excessive health services
utilization (Hillman et al, 1989; Wolfe et al., 1992, Léger, 2000). However, this result may not
hold in a model such as ours when primary-care physicians advise patients not only regarding the
use of their own services, but also regarding the advisability of the services of other providers such
as in-hospital care provided by a specialist. Indeed, primary-care physicians paid via capitation
have an incentive to over-refer to hospital, since this may reduce the physician’s workload without
a¤ecting his orher income. On the other hand, primary-carephysicians paid via feefor servicemay
under-refer to hospital (in comparison with an e¢cient rate) since services provided by hospital-
based specialists do not generate additional income. We analyze consequences of both kinds of
incentives, and possible mechanisms for overcoming them, in our model below.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we specify the basic
model and consider the case where both patients and doctors are fully informed in the sense that
the patient has the same information as the doctor with respect to the patient’s illness and the
e¤ectiveness of medical treatment, and insurance is of the conventional type with providers being
paid through fee for service. In section 3, we then consider the case where there is asymmetric
information in the sense that doctors know both the patient’s illness severity and the e¤ectiveness
of di¤erent types of treatment, but patients do not. We analyze this case both with conventional
insurance, and with insurance through managed-care plans in which doctors are paid through
capitation or salary. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2 The Basic Model with Fully Informed Patients
To simplify the analysis, we assume that individuals have at most one illness episode in each
time period and that all sick consumers su¤er from the same kind of illness, although the degree
of severity may di¤er from patient to patient. Depending on the degree of severity, the illness
5may either be treated by a primary-care physician (henceforth referred to as a GP) or by an
in-hospital specialist. Hospital treatment is assumed to involve more advanced technology than
GP treatment. For example, hospital treatment may take the form of an operation performed by
specialists (surgeons, anesthesiologists) assisted by a team of nurses in an operating theater.
Intuitively, one can think of individuals as having an initial endowment of health, and illness as
constituting an exogenous loss of part of this endowment. To partially o¤set this loss, individuals
utilize health services to produce health. One may think of GP and in-hospital specialist services
as alternative inputs that can be used in producing health. When the amount to be produced is
relatively small (that is, when the exogenous loss of health is relatively small), treatment by a GP
may be su¢cient. However, one can think of the production of health via GP services as being
subject to diminishing returns at relatively small quantities. For those whose illness shocks are
large and who therefore want to produce a large amount of health, treatment by specialists in a
hospital (i.e., and operation) may bea more e¢cient choice. That is, theaverage cost of producing
a large amount of health for a given individual may be lower if the patient is hospitalized than if
he tries to produce the same amount of health through a large amount of GP services. For some
kinds of illness, diminishing returns may be so strong that there is an upper limit on the amount of
health that can be produced using GP services (i.e., beyond thisquantity, the marginal and average
cost becomes in…nite). In such cases, hospitalization is the only alternative.
The nature of the production process in a hospital (e.g., if the patient undergoes an operation)
can also bethought ofasinvolving an indivisibility. Forexample, it is not possible foran individual
to undergo half an operation (or for two individuals to share the bene…ts of a single operation).
Formally, one can represent this indivisibility by the restriction that each hospitalization episode
entails production of at least a …xed minimum number ofunits of health. Thecost ofthis minimum
number can be thought of as an episode-speci…c…xed cost, with each unit below this …xed minimum
having a marginal cost of zero.4
4For simplicity, we assume that there is no episode-speci…c …xed cost associated with GP services. If there is,
6Using subscript G to denote GP services and S to denote in-hospital specialist services, we
represent the above considerations by de…ning two cost functions CG(q) and CS(q), where q is the
quantity of health produced during a given illness episode. Using a lower-case letter for marginal
cost (that is, de…ning C0
J(q) = cJ(q); J = G;S), we assume cG(q) > cS(q); 8q: The shapes of the
marginal cost functions in Figure 1 re‡ect the diminishing returns to health services in producing
health, givingrisetoincreasing marginal costs. Consistent with theindivisibility ofhospital services
production, the marginal cost of hospital services is zero up until the minimum quantity q0 but
positive thereafter. Moreover, we assume that there exists some b q such that CS(q) < CG(q) for
q > b q; i.e., b q is that (relatively large) break-even value of q where the episode-speci…c …xed cost
of hospitalization is just o¤set by the lower marginal cost for each unit produced in a hospital.
Diagrammatically, this is thepoint where the di¤erence between the areas under the marginal cost
curves cG(q) and cS(q) is equal to the episode-speci…c …xed costs for hospital services. We denote
this…xed cost by FS: Initially, weassumethat there isperfect competition in the provision ofhealth
services, so that provider charges exactly cover total costs for each quantity provided.5
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In the…rst version ofthemodel, we assumethat patients have the sameinformation about their
illness and the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent kinds of medical treatment as their doctors and choose both
thequantity ofcareand theprovider, at given prices(i.e., from a’pricelist’ perepisodeand quantity
of health produced by each provider). We also assume that patients can purchase actuarially fair
insurance prior to the revelation of illness severity.
The insurer can only observe patients’ illness severity imperfectly, so state-contingent contracts
are not possible. Instead, cost control is in the form of some degree of patient cost sharing (i.e.,
demand-side incentives). Given their insurance coverage, and once illness severity is revealed,
there will be some range of illness severity for which the patient’s optimum choice will be ’no care’.
5Even though the cost curves in Figure 1 display rising marginal cost per unit of health, the marginal cost per
unit of health services (physician visits, hospital days) may be constant. In the case of hospital services, however, it
may be more realistic to think of a two-part pricing scheme: One charge for major one-time procedures (such as an
operation), then a per-diem charge that depends on the length of the patient’s stay.
7patients will choose whether to receive care from a primary-care physician (GP), or to enter a
hospital to be treated by a hospital-based specialist. They will also choose what quantity ofhealth
to produce (by choosing the quantity of services to utilize).
Formally, we specify a model in which the representative consumer i’s utility depends on con-
sumption X and health H. Health, in turn depends on the value of a state variable µ which we
interpret as an illness severity variable or an ’illness shock’ (with large values of µ corresponding
to more severe illnesses). Given the patient’s use of health services, H is then de…ned as H=q-µ.
Ex ante (when buying insurance), the patient does not know what µ is going to be, though it is
assumed that its cumulative distribution function F(µ) is known. Ex post, however (when choosing
what provider to use and what services to buy) the patients knows µ. We assume that the patient
has a conventional insurance contract with co-payment rate ¯ and premium ®: In each state, the
patient receivesa (state-independent) incomeI. Sinceµ is known ex post, thepatient can maximize
utility in each state given µ; the patient maximizes utility by choosing a provider J where J may




U(X; H); J =G or S (1)
subject to
X =I ¡¯CJ(q) ¡® (2)
and
H =q ¡µ: (3)
To solve this problem, thepatient …nds the two quantities qJ that are optimal when J is G and
S, respectively, and compares the levels of maximized utility for each provider type. For future
reference, denote these maximized utilities by VJ( µ; ¯); J = G;S. For either provider type, the
8…rst-order condition corresponding to the optimal choice of q is





; i =X;H: (5)
For a given µ and J, (4) de…nes a demand curve for health as a function of the marginal price
of health produced by the Jth provider, ¯cJ(q): A su¢cient condition for this demand curve to be
downward-sloping isthat UXH =UHX >0 (seeAppendix 1). For simplicity, wehenceforth impose
the assumption that this condition holds.
We now show:
Proposition 1:
If conditions are such that care provided by G will be chosen for some µ while S will be chosen
for other µ, then S will be chosen if and only if µ > µC for some critical value µC: That is,
VS(µ;¯) ¸VG(µ; ¯) if µ ¸µC: (6)
To establish Proposition 1, we can …rst easily show the following lemma.:
Lemma 1: The quantity of care demanded for a particular type of care (either GP or in-hospital




Proof: See Appendix 2.
To proveProposition 1, consider …rst (in Figure2) thequantity qG(µ) which denotes the optimal
quantity the consumer chooses if provision were from a GP. Then de…ne the compensated demand
9curve D(µ; G) by …nding the quantities the consumer would choose at di¤erent marginal costs
if his net income were continuously varied so as to keep his utility at VG(µ;¯). By de…nition
VG(µ;¯) = U(I ¡®¡¯CG(qG);qG ¡µ): Therefore at the point qS on this compensated demand
curve we can write the consumer’s utility as U(I ¡ ®¡ ¯CG(qG) ¡Z;qS ¡ µ), where Z is the
compensating variation necessary to keep utility constant as the consumer utilizes qS units of
health (rather than qG). Thus, Z is a measure of the incremental value of the additional health
services qS ¡qG. But now note that the actual cost of utilizing qS is given by CS(qS). Thus, if
¯(CS(qS) ¡CG(qG)) <Z (8)
then choosing qG cannot be optimal, and provision should instead be from S.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Condition (8) can be illustrated diagrammatically as in Figure 2. To interpret the …gure, it is







cs(qS)dq ¡Z < 0 (9)
where we have use the de…nitions of marginal cost cJ(q), J = G;S (note that cS(q) = 0 for
0 < q < q0), and where Z is the area under the compensated demand curve D(µ; G), given by
area (C) + (D) in Figure 2. In (9), the second term corresponds to area (A) while the third
term is area (D). Diagrammatically, therefore, condition (8) is equivalent to the condition that
¯FS < (A) + (C). The proof of Proposition 1 is completed by observing that an increase in µ
increases Z (diagrammatically, it shifts the compensated demand curve to the right, increasing
(A)+(C)). Thus, there is only one value of µ for which (8) will hold with equality.
The following corollary is also immediate.
Corollary: In the neighbourhood of the critical value of µC, (where ¯(CS(qS) ¡CG(qG)) =Z)
total expenditures if hospital care is chosen is larger than total expenditure if GP care is
chosen.
102.0.1 Choice of provider and e¢cient insurance
We now examine the role of insurance in the above model; more speci…cally, we consider how a
change in insurance coverage will alter both the mix and quantities of health services purchased.
Although a decrease in the co-insurance rate (for a given provider type) will lead to greater
health-services consumption (the well-know moral hazard problem), a change in the insurance
parameter ¯ will also lead to a change in the critical value µC. That is, it will change the illness
severity at which the patient will switch to hospital care.
Proposition 2: For a given insurance premium ®, a decrease in ¯ (the co-insurance rate) will
decrease the critical value of µC, i.e. the critical point where the patient switches from ’GP
care’ to ’in-hospital specialty care’ will occur at lower severity of illnesses.
Proof: Observe that at a given µC, it must be the case that ¯(CS(qS) ¡ CG(qG)) = Z: A
reduction in ¯ will reduce the LHS but does not a¤ect the compensating variation denoted by Z
(which also equals area (C) +(D) in the above diagram). Therefore, at a lower ¯, the LHS will be
less than Z. Consequently, it will be in the patient’s best interest to switch to hospital care at a
µ < µC.
In the health economics literature, consideration hasalso been given to what isan e¢cient value
of¯, i.e., an e¢cient degree ofpatient cost sharing. Below we show that thesolutionto thisproblem
will, in general, depend on both the tendency for a decrease in ¯ to a¤ect the optimal quantity of
care given by a particular provider, and on its in‡uence on the critical value of µ determining the
choice of provider.
An analysisoftheproblemofe¢cient cost sharing requiresconsideration ofthee¤ect ofpatients’
behaviour on insurance premiums. Assuming competitive insurance markets so that premiums are





11where F(µ) is the cumulative distribution of µ, and J = G for µ < µC and J = S for µ ¸ µC:
The solution to the optimal insurance problem consists in …nding that ¯ which maximizes the
consumer’s expected utility subject to (10), where q(µ) and µC are determined as analyzed above.
Consumers’ expected utility is given by:
EU(¯; µC;®(¯; µC)) =
Z
µ
U(I ¡®¡¯CJ(q(µ)); q(µ) ¡µ)dFµ: (11)
In the next proposition, weshow that the nature ofthe moral-hazard related ine¢ciency in this
model consists not only in over-utilization for a given provider, but also in a tendency to switch
providers at an ine¢ciently low level of illness severity µ (one can interpret this as a second form of
ex post moral hazard): We demonstratethis by showing that the consumer’s expected utility under
an actuarially fair insurance contract would increase if he could be induced to use a larger critical
value µC at which to switch from GP care to in-hospital specialty care than would be individually
optimal without such a restriction. .
Proposition 3: An insured consumer will choose an ine¢ciently small critical value µC at
which to be hospitalized.
Proof: Observe that at the critical value µC, VG(µC; ¯) = VS(µC;¯): Consider now the e¤ect
of a change in the critical value µC on expected utility, i.e. dE
dµC .
dE










@® < 0 and CG(q)¡CS(q) <0, dE
dµC > 0: Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 has implicationsfor thee¢cient degree ofcost sharing, or equivalently, thedesign
of a second-best insurance plan. To see this, note that by treating µC as an endogenous variable,




























The …rst term within round brackets re‡ects the standard trade-o¤ between the incremental loss
from less completeinsuranceandthereductionin theconventional moral-hazarde¤ect asthedegree
of cost sharing is increased, holding µC constant (if µC were given, this term would have to be zero
in a second-best optimal plan). However, if (13) is evaluated at the critical value that theconsumer
would choose for a given value of ¯ and ®, the …rst term inside the second set of brackets would
be zero. Moreover, since CG(q) <CS(q), the insurance premium ® is decreasing in µC: Therefore
if the critical value µC is chosen by the consumer, equation (13) would be positive at the value of
¯ where the …rst term in round brackets would be zero (since µC increases with ¯ and @EU
@® <0).
Taking this e¤ect into account, it is clear that the optimum degree of cost sharing is higher
when the e¤ect through the choice of critical value µC is taken into account, than it would be for a
…xed µC: Moreover, supposeit were possible forthe insurer to verify the valueofµ. Ifthis could be
done at no cost, an insurance policy that speci…ed optimally chosen values of both ¯, and µC would
involve a µC higher than what consumers themselves would choose at any given ¯, but would give
a higher expected utility than a policy specifying an optimally chosen cost-sharing parameter ¯
alone(i.e., it would ’delay’ hospitalizationbut yield a higherexpected utility). Managed care plans
requiring a second opinion beforecovering hospitalization, but in other wayssimilarto conventional
insurance, can be regarded as a real-world example consistent with this …nding.
3 Asymmetric Patient-Doctor Information
In the preceding analysis, we assumed that both doctors and patients perfectly observed the value
of µ but that µ could not be observed by the insurer (so that state-contingent insurance contract
were infeasible). We also implicitly assumed that providers were paid on the basis of fee-for-
serviceand that health services were produced in competitivemarkets(so that theirprices re‡ected
13their opportunity costs). Many health economists, however, would describe the assumption of
no information asymmetry between doctors and patients as unrealistic, especially when taken in
conjunction with the presumed information asymmetry between providers and insurers. Indeed,
if both doctors and patients knew the exact value of µ in each illness episode it would seem that
state-contingent contracts would be possible especially if µ could also be observed by a third party.
In this section, therefore, we extend the analysis to the case where there is information asymmetry
between doctors and patients and patients can only imperfectly observe the value of µ.
Moreprecisely, assumethat thedistributionF(µ) from which illnessseverity is drawnisbounded
by µ0; µLand is subdivided into L intervals
£
µl¡1; µl¤
; l = 1;:::;L. Although the patient does not
observe the exact value of µ, we assume that he or she can distinguish between these intervals
(classes of illness); that is, the patient knows in which interval his or hertrueµ islocated. However,
there is information asymmetry: A physician can costlessly observe each patient’s precise µ (can
costlessly diagnose the patient’s illness). Initially, we continue to assume that doctors, both GPs
and hospital-based specialists, are paid on the basis of feefor service. We also assume that doctors
know the boundaries of the intervals that de…ne the patient’s information.6
With information asymmetry, the patient has to rely on the advice of the doctor in order
to decide on the amount of treatment. If there is perfect competition in the market for health
services, providers are indi¤erent as to how many units they sell to individual patients, and so,
have no reason to exploit their information advantage in order to sell additional units. However,
most analystsbelievethat themarketsforphysician and hospital servicesarebettercharacterized as
monopolistically competitive. In a market with monopolisticcompetition, sellers who can increase
the amount demanded by individual buyers through the advice they give, have an incentive to do
so.7
6We assume implicitly that neither patients, nor the insurance provider, can infer ex post whether or not the
treatment was appropriate (within each illness intervals).
7Formal models of asymmetric information in medical care include Dranove (1988) and Rochaix (1989). Both
authors specify probability distributions that link patients’ beliefs about the way they should be treated, to the ’true’
underlying illness conditions, and employ models in which the patient’s problem is whether to accept or reject a
doctor’s treatment recommendation based on their beliefs about their illness condition and their beliefs about the
14In the present context, doctors (GPs and hospital-based specialists) typically have an incentive
to tell patients that the value of their illness parameter is at the upper end of the relevant interval.
Theexception isfor patients whoseillness severity liesin theinterval which containsµC (thecritical
value at which a well-informed patient would switch from GP services to in-hospital specialty
services). In that interval, a GP’s incentive is to report a value just below µC, while a specialist
would report a value at the upper end of the interval.
Assuming that patientscorrectly perceivetheir physicians’ incentives, they realizethat in reality,
their illness severity is unlikely to always be at the upper end of the relevant intervals. However,
they have no way of …nding out what the true value of illness is. As a result, they must decide
on the quantity of treatment to receive (and, in the interval which includes the critical value µC
(which we denote by r), from what provider), knowing only which interval they are in. Thus, the
quantity chosen will depend only on the interval, not on the value of µ within the interval.
Assuming patients know that distribution function F(µ), for a given interval l, insurance pre-
mium ®, and co-insurance rate ¯, the patient maximizes expected utility for the interval by choice
of a single value ql








dF (µ) =0 (14)
where, J = G for intervals l = 1;:::; r ¡1 and J = S for intervals l = r +1; :::;L. For l = r, J
may be G or S depending on which choice yields the higher level of utility at the quantity that
maximizes expected utility.
As before, an actuarial fairness constraint of type (10) but with a constant quantity ql
J in each
doctor’s information and strategy. The solution depends in part on either the cost of not being treated (Dranove)
or of obtaining a recommendation from another doctor (Rochaix). Our approach simpli…es the problem both by
the way we specify patient beliefs and because we model the quantity of treatment as being decided by the patient;
asymmetric information remains important, however, because it in‡uences the way the patient treats information
conveyed by doctors in making the quantity decision.










We can once again consider the problem of …nding the insurance contract f¯; ®(¯)g that is
second-best optimal in the sense of balancing appropriately the moral-hazard loss associated with
overutilization of health services against the gains from more complete insurance. In solving this
problem, however, one must take account of the possibility that the function ®(¯) may have a
discontinuity if there is a value of ¯C such that the consumer switches from G to S in the rth
interval. Using reasoning similar to that employed in establishing Proposition 1, it can be shown
that if there is such a ¯C, it will be the case that the consumer chooses J = G for ¯ > ¯C
and J = S for ¯ < ¯C. For a given ®, it can also be shown that around ¯C, the actuarial-fair
premium will increaseby the…niteamount (1¡¯C)P(r)[CS(qr
S)¡CG(qr
G)]. Otherthings equal, this
discontinuity makes it more likely that the second-best optimal value of ¯ would be just slightly
above ¯C, as we consider the optimal degree of cost sharing for a variety of cost and demand
conditions. Intuitively, this once again suggest that incentives and rules a¤ecting the decision of
whether or not to hospitalize patients in marginal cases are important in designing real world
insurance plans.
3.1 Managed Care
In the previous section, we assumed that patients werecovered by a conventional insurance plan in
which they themselves decided what quantity of services to utilize, given their information about
illness severity. Furthermore, physicianswereassumed to bepaid on thebasisoffeeforservice, and
their rolewaslimitedto supplying thequantity the patients decided to utilize, given theirinsurance
contract; theinsurer’s rolewasthat ofa passive payer of bills. In thissection, weconsiderinsurance
plans in which the insurer takes a more active role in in‡uencing the services their patients utilize,
i.e., managed-care plans.
16One way wedistinguish managed-care plans from conventional insurance is by assuming that in
managed-careplans physiciansarepaid by a methodsuch as capitation or salary. With thesemodes
of payments, physicians have no incentive to exploit their information advantage for the purposeof
inducing additional demands for their services. The other fundamental di¤erence between our rep-
resentation of managed care and conventional insurance is that for the former, we assume that the
insurance contract speci…eswhat quantity ofcarethepatient will receivein di¤erent circumstances,
and from what provider.
Given this new speci…cation, the question arises as to how managed-care contracts can be
enforced when the insurer cannot observe the patient’s illness severity. Theanswer to this question
is that wedon’t assume contracts to be speci…ed in such a way as to providefor a di¤erent quantity
ofservices for each valueofµ. Instead, weassume contractsthat specify a singlequantity ofservices
for each of the intervals referred to above (i.e., the intervals that represent the degree to which the
patient knows his or her illness severity). Consequently, even though a doctor paid by capitation
or salary has an incentive to downplay the patient’s illness severity, his ability to e¤ectively do so
is limited by the patient’s knowledge of the lower bound of the interval in which the true illness
severity lies.
Note also, that the joint incentive for patient and doctor to over-state illness severity to the
insurer under fee for service is not present under managed care since the physician’s incentive
under, for example, capitation is to understate, not overstate, illness severity. Even though the
patient’s and physicians’ opposing incentives do not induce the doctor to reveal his knowledge of
the true value of µ; it at least enables the insurer to e¤ectively enforce a contract that speci…es
a di¤erent value of services for each interval (even though the insurer cannot directly observe the
illness severity or even the interval in which it falls). Note also that under managed-care contracts
of this type, costs can be contained without relying on patient cost sharing.8 Thus, we assume
8Baumgardner (1991) is an early paper that characterizes managed-care plans as insurance that uses speci…ed
quantites of care, rather than patient cost sharing, as a way of limiting costs.
17initially that the managed-care contracts have zero cost sharing.
Thepreceding paragraphsreferto thoseintervalsin which only a singleproviderwould havebeen
chosen under full information. Consider now the critical interval containing µC (where the patient
…rst seeks in-hospital care). Recall that wedenoted thisinterval as rth interval. Although a general
practitioner paid by capitation would have an incentive to refer a patient to hospital anywhere in
therth interval, hospital doctors are also assumed to observethepatient’s trueillnessseverity µ. As
a consequence, they can therefore refuseto accept patients with a µ below a contractually speci…ed
level.9 For this reason, a managed-care contract can credibly specify a critical µC in this interval
such that the patient will be treated in hospital if and only if theµ observed by thedoctors is above
that level, as well as separate quantities to be supplied depending on where the patient is treated.
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where® is the actuarially fair premium of the form given by (10). That is, thecontract will specify
a given quantity qG of GP services in each of the lower intervals, given quantities qG and qS in the
lower and upper parts of the rth interval, a critical value µC dividing this interval, and quantities
of in-hospital specialist services qS in each of the upper intervals.
If the insurance market is competitive, the equilibrium contract is the one that maximizes the
representative consumer’sexpected utility by choiceof theseL+1 quantities referred to above, and
µC, subject to the actuarial fairness constraint. The necessary …rst order conditions are:
Z µl
µl¡1UH(ql
J;µ)dF(µ) ¡¸(CJ(q))P(l) = 0 (17)
for l = 1; :::;r¡1; r+1;:::; L and P(l) =
R µl
µ
l¡1dF(µ) and where J =G for r+1; :::;r¡1 and J =S
for r+1; :::;L









S;µ)dF(µ) ¡¸(CS(qr))P (r; S) = 0 (19)
where P (r;G) is the proportion of patients that fall in that rth¡interval who use GP care and
P (r;S) is theproportion ofpatients that fall in that rth interval and use in-hospital specialty care.






The actuarial fairness constraint de…ning (®) is of the form given by (15) and ¸ is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the actuarial fairness constraint.
Clearly, a contract of this form will yield an expected utility that is lower than a full-information
state-contingent contract. However, a more interesting question is whether it will yield a higher
expected utility than the second-best optimal conventional contract under information asymmetry.
At …rstglance, onemight expect that optimally chosen quantitiesunderamanaged-carecontract
would necessarily yield a higher expected utility than under patient cost sharing, since managed-
care contracts with no patient cost sharing providesforthe samelevel of consumption ofnon-health
goodsand services in each state. However, ifthemarginal utility ofconsumption dependson health
status, it is theoretically possible that theimplicit redistribution of consumption across states with
conventional cost sharing raises expected utility. If such is the case, the lack of any patient cost
sharing under managed caremay, paradoxically, yield a lowerexpected utility than under a second-
best conventional contract.
By the sametoken, there is no reason why some degreeofpatient cost sharing could not bepart
of a second-best optimal managed-care contract. If interval speci…c cost-sharing parameters ¯l are
permitted, it can be shown that a second-best managed-care contract will dominate a second-best
19conventional insurance contract.10 Thus, we have Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: Under imperfect information, the optimal managed-care contact of the form
(16) with optimally chosen interval-speci…c cost-sharing parameters ¯l yields higher expected utility
than the optimal conventional contract of the form f®;¯(®)g.
Proof: Under a conventional contract with imperfect information, thevalues ofhealth services
utilization and consumption are both constant in each interval l, but are chosen so as to satisfy
restrictions of the form (17-20). With a managed-care contract with interval-speci…c cost-sharing
parameters, the constant levels of health services utilization and consumption in each interval can
be optimally chosen without restrictions.
Note that Proposition 4 would still be true if consumers in conventional plans always knew
whether or not their illness severity parameter µ were above or below the optimum critical value
of µC and could choose appropriately among providers in the rth interval. In practice, however, a
substantial part of the e¢ciency gains achievable through a second-best optimal managed care plan
of the form (16) may be due to the fact that consumers in conventional plans do not know where
in the rth interval they are and, as a result, can only choose one type of provider in that interval.
If they consistently choose S (that is, choose in-hospital specialty care), total costs are likely to be
considerably higher than they would be if those below µC would choose G. Indeed, studies of the
reason why HMOs in the US are able to provide care at costs below those of conventional plans
have pointed to less utilization of hospital services as an important part of the explanation.
4 Conclusion
In thispaperwehaveextended theanalysisof theinteraction between insuranceandhealth services
utilization to the case where there is a choice for consumers with di¤erent illness severity not only
with respect to the quantities ofservices to utilize, but also among types ofproviders with di¤erent
cost conditions; our main example has been the choice between outpatient primary-care physicians
10If we allow for interval speci…c cost-sharing, the actuarial fairness constraint and …rst-order-conditions would
have to be modi…ed in an obvious way.
20and treatment in hospital.
Our analysis shows that consideration of the patient’s incentive to choose between outpatient
and hospital care is important for …nding the e¢cient degree of patient cost sharing in models
of second-best optimal conventional insurance. Patients with lower degrees of cost sharing have
too small an incentive to choose the lowest-cost provider. The e¢ciency loss associated with this
e¤ect is in addition to that associated with the tendency of consumers with lower cost sharing to
overutilize services from given providers.
Generally this result holds as well when it is assumed that there is information asymmetry
between patients and providers, even though in this case outpatient providers paid via fee for
service may have an incentive to understate patients’ illness severity in certain circumstances, in
order to discourage them from seeking hospital care.
We also consider the case where insurance takes the form of prepayment plans in which the
quantity of care in di¤erent states is not chosen by the patient but is speci…ed in the insurance
contract. If it is assumed that the patient’s illness state is costlessly observable by patients and
insurers as well as by doctors, it would bepossible to design a prepayment plan of this form that is
…rst-best optimal both in the sense of making patients utilize the e¢cient volume of services given
the choice of provider, and to choose e¢ciently between the two kinds of provider in given illness
states.
If there is asymmetric information in the sense that illness severity cannot be perfectly ob-
served by patients and insurers, …rst-best prepayment contracts cannot be credibly enforced. How-
ever, second-best prepayment plans can be designed through managed-care contracts under which
providers are subject to supply-side incentives to control service utilization (for example, by being
paid through salary or capitation), and the quantity of care promised under the plan is contingent
on the consumers’ (imperfect) information regarding their illness severity. Although any such plan
clearly must yield lower expected utility than a …rst-best prepayment plan would, we …nd that a
second-best optimal managed care plan dominates a second-best optimal conventional plan with
21cost control through demand-sidecost sharing, at least ifit allowsforsomedegreeofinterval-speci…c
cost sharing.
Although we believe that these results are of considerable interest, their signi…cance of course
is tempered by the restrictiveness of the assumptions built into the models from which they are
derived. In particular, the assumption that all consumers facethesameprobability distribution for
theillness severity parameterrules out consideration ofproblems with cream skimming and adverse
selection. Another important assumption is that even in the cases where patients and insurers
cannot observe precisely the patient’s illness severity parameter, they can observe the quantities of
servicesthat providersrender. Ifthesequantitiesareimperfectly observableaswell, the superiority
of managed care plans over conventional insurance is no longer guaranteed.
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24Let F(q;¯; µ) =Ux(¡¯cJ(q)) +UH





We know that Fq > 0 if UXX(:;:) < 0; UHH(:;:) < 0 and UXH(:; :)= UHX(:; :) ¸ 0: (Su¢cient
but not necessary).
and,
¡F¯ =cJUX(:;:) ¡¯cJUXX(CJ(q)) +UHX(:;:)(CJ(q)) >0 (21)













Fµ =¯cJUXH(:;:) ¡UHH(:; :) > 0 (22)
if UXH(:; :) ¸0 and UHH(:;:) <0:(Su¢cient but not necessary)
and where,
¡Fq = ¡(¯cJ)2UXX(:; :)+¯cJ(UXH(:; :) +UHX(:;:)) ¡UHH(:;:) >0 (23)
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